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THE CONSTITUTIONAL DIMENSION OF
DISCOVERY IN DWI CASES
DANIELJ. CROTHERS*
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently national attention has focused on the victims of
drunk drivers - the physically injured and society.' The public
finally seems committed to removing alcohol impaired drivers from
the nation's roadways. The concern is justified. Recent statistics
show that more than half of all traffic fatalities and injuries involve
a drinking driver. 2 The economic and emotional impact of this
alcohol induced nightmare is beyond measure.
To combat the problem of the drunk driver, states have
increased efforts to prosecute persons operating motor vehicles
while under the influence of alcohol.3 Congress has thrown its
*B.A., University of North Dakota, 1979: J.D.. University of North Dakota, 1982: Law Clerk.
New Mexico Court of Appeals, Santa Fe, New Mexico, 1982-1983.
1. See, e.g., Haddon & Blumenthal, Foreword to H. Ross. DETERRING THE DRINKING DRIVER at
xiii-xx (1982) (concern for the carnage caused by alcohol related accidents has prompted the
legislatures to promulgate strict laws that attempt to deter individuals from driving while
intoxicated).
2. See NATIONAL SAFETY COUNCIL, ACCIDENT FACTS 52 (1982): NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC
SAFETY ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, FATAL ACCIDENT REPORTING
SYSTEM 1979, 27-28 (1981). The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration's 1979 figures
show that 28.7% of the drivers involved in fatal crashes had been drinking. Id. at 27-28. Controlled
studies indicate, however, that one-third to one-half of the deaths are alcohol related. Id. The
National Highway Safety Administration's explanation for this discrepancy is that only 57% of the
fatally iniured drivers were tested for alcohol: surviving drivers were rarer tested. Id. The
Administration also stated that the official figures are lower due to incomplete and subjective
accident reports. Id.
3. See generally H. Ross, DETERRING THE DRINKING DRIVER 1-10 (1982) (examines the
effectiveness of the deterrence model for driving-while-intoxicated offenses).
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support behind the states' efforts by considering legislation 4 that
would provide financial aid to states that improve enforcement of
driving-while-intoxicated (DWI) laws.
5
Concomitant with vigorous enforcement of the law comes the
legitimate concern that the "get tough" DWI laws may unduly
infringe upon the driver's rights. To the legal profession this
concern signifies a duty to be more than cheerleaders for the DWI
crackdown. Rather, increased enforcement means that defendants
must have an opportunity to ensure that their rights and liberties
have not been wrongfully impinged. Constitutional due process
constraints require that the DWI defendant's rights be protected.
An important aspect of protecting a defendant's interests is the
employment of competent counsel. This Article provides lawyers
with a general discussion of the law of disco' ery in DWI cases.
Major emphasis is on discovery of breathalyzer test and reference
ampoules.
6
II. DISCOVERY IN DWI CASES
A. HISTORY OF DWI DISCOVERY
The starting point in a discussion of discovery in DWI cases is
4. See, e.g., H.R. 6170, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 128 CONt;. REc. 1591, 1625 (1982) (grants to
states with programs reducing driving-while-intoxicated hazards); S. 2158, 97th Cong., 2d Sess.,
128 CoNG. REC. 541, 1387 (1982) (national driver's registry for collection of individual driving
records); S. 2159, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 128 CONC;. REc. 541, 1387 (1982) (bill to amend the
Bankruptcy Act to prohibit discharge of debts resulting from liability based on driving-while-
intoxicated offenses).
5. Operation of motor vehicles while under the influence of alcohol is referred to by different
names in different jurisdictions. See, e.g., CAL. VEH. CODE § 23153 (West Supp. 1982) (driving while
intoxicated); N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-08-01 (Supp. 1981) (driving under the influence ofintoxicating
liquor); OR. REv. STAT. § 487.540 (1981) (driving while under the influence of intoxicants). For
uniformity within this Article, operation of a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol will
be referred to as "driving while intoxicated" oras "DWI."
6. The California Supreme Court explained in People v. Hitch how breathalyzers and ampoules
determine whether an individual is legally intoxicated. See People v. Hitch, 12 Cal. 3d 641, 644, 527
P.2d 361, 363, 117 Cal. Rptr. 9, 11 (1974). The Hitch court stated:
The breathalyzer used in the test is an electrically powered apparatus designed to
calculate the extent of alcohol in the suspect's circulatory system. The suspect blows
into a tube and a sample of his breath is trapped inside the machine. The trapped
sample is then permitted to bubble through a glass test ampoule containing three cubic
centimeters of 0.025 percent potassium dichromate in a 50-percent-by-volume
sulphuric acid solution which acts as a reagent to any alcohol suspended upon the
suspect's breath. If alcohol is present in the sample, it produces a change in the color
and the light transmissibility of the solution. Upon the passage of a light beam through
the test ampoule, the relative light transmissibility of the solution is registered on a
meter which calculates the percent of alcohol in the suspect's blood.
The machine is calibrated so as to provide a reading by establishing a correlation
between the test ampoule and a reference ampoule which is identical in specification.
It is essential to the accuracy of the test that a quantity of exactly three cubic
centimeters of the solution be present in each. This is checked by a gauge in the
machine and a test ampoule not meeting the requirement is discarded.
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the 1974 California Supreme Court case of People v. Hitch.7 In Hitch
the defendant was arrested for driving a motor vehicle while under
the influence of intoxicating liquor.8  The arresting officer
administered a breathalyzer test, which revealed a blood alcohol
level of 0.20%. 9 After the test the officer followed department
procedure by discarding the test ampoule. 10
Prior to trial, the defendant moved to suppress the results of
the breathalyzer test, alleging that destruction of the ampoule and
its chemical contents denied him due process of law.11 The
California Supreme Court agreed with the defendant, stating that
7. 12 Cal. 3d 641, 527 P.2d 361, 117 Cal. Rptr. 9 (1974).
8. People v. Hitch, 12 Cal. 3d 641, 644, 527 P.2d 361, 363, 117 Cal. Rptr. 9, 11 (1974).
9. Id. The states have adopted statutory breath alcohol levels that are presumptive of legal
intoxication. See ALA. CODE S 32-5A-194 (Supp. 1982) (0.10%, presumption of intoxication);
ALASKA STAT. § 28.35.033 (Supp. 1982) (0.10%, presumption of intoxication); ARiz. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 28-692 (Supp. 1982) (0.10%, presumption of intoxication); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 75-1031.1
(1979) (0.10%, presumption of intoxication); CAL. VEH. CODE S 23126 (West 1971) (0.10%,
presumption of intoxication); CoLo. REv. STAT. § 42-4-1202 (Supp. 1982) (0.10%, presumption of
intoxication); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 14-227 (1981)(0.10%, prima facie evidence of intoxication); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 3505 (1979) (0.10 %, prima facie evidence of intoxication); D.C. CODE ANN.
S 40-609a (1973) (0.10% prima facie proof of intoxication); FLA. STAT. § 322.262 (1981) (0.10%,
prima facie evidence of intoxication); GA. CODE ANN. § 68A-902.1 (Supp. 1982) (0.10%,
presumption of intoxication); HAwAII REV. STAT. § 291-5 (1976) (0.10%, presumption of
intoxication); IDAHO CODE § 49-1102 (1980) (0.081%, presumption of intoxication); ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 95 Y2, § 11-501 (Smith-Hurd 1979) (0.10%, presumption of intoxication); IND. CODE ANN. § 9-4-
1-54 (Burns Supp. 1982) (0.10%, prima facie evidence of intoxication); IOWA CODE § 321.281 (1981)
(0.10%, presumption of intoxication); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 8-1005 (1975) (0.10%, presumption of
intoxication); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. 5 189.520 (Bobbs-Merrill 1980) (0.10%, presumption of
intoxication); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. 5 32:662 (West Supp. 1982) (0.10%, presumption of
intoxication); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 29, § 1312 (1978) (0.10%, prima facie evidence of
intoxication); MD. CTs. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 10-307 (Supp. 1982) (0.08%, prima facie
evidence of impairment; 0.13 % prima facie evidence of intoxication); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 90, § 24
(Michie/Law. Co-op. Supp. 1982) (0.10 %, presumption of intoxication); MICH. COMP. LAws ANN.
S 257.625a (Supp. 1982) (0.10%, presumption of intoxication); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 169.121 (West
1980) (0.10%, prima facie evidence of intoxication); Miss. CODE ANN. § 63-11-39 (Supp. 1982)
(0.10%, presumption of intoxication); Mo. REv. STAT. § 557.037 (Supp. 1982) (0.10%, prima facie
evidence of intoxication); MONT. CODE ANN. § 61-8-401 (1981) (0.10%, presumption of
intoxication); NEB. REV. STAT. § 39-669.07 (Supp. 1982) (0.10%, prima facie evidence of
intoxication); NEV. REv. STAT. § 484.381 (1981) (0.10%, presumption of intoxication); N.H. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 265:89 (1982) (0.10%, prima facie evidence of intoxication); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:4-
50.1 (West Supp. 1982) (0.10%, presumption of intoxication); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 68-8-110 (Supp.
1982) (0.10%, presumption of intoxication); N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAw § 1192 (Consol. Supp. 1982)
(0.10%, presumption of intoxication); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-139.1 (Supp. 1981) (0.10%,
presumption of intoxication); N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-20-07 (1980) amended by S. 2373, 48th Leg.,
N.D. Sess. Laws - (effective July 1, 1983) (0.10%, prima facie evidence of intoxication);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4511.19 (Page 1982) (0.10%, presumption of intoxication); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 47, § 756 (West Supp. 1982) (0.10%, prima facie evidence of intoxication); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 487.545 (1981) (0.10%, per se intoxication); PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 1547 (Purdon 1977) (0.10%,
presumption of intoxication); P.R. LAws ANN. tit. 9, § 1041 (Supp. 1975) (0.15%, presumption of
intoxication); R.I. GEN. LAws § 31-27-2.1 (Supp. 1982) (0.10%, presumption of intoxication); S.C.
CODE ANN. 5 56-5-2950 (Law. Co-op. 1977) (0.10%, presumption of intoxication); S.D. COMp.
LAws ANN. 5 32-23-7 (1969) (0.15%, presumption of intoxication); TENN. CODE ANN. § 55-10-408
(1980) (0.10%, presumption of intoxication); TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6701L-5 (Vernon
1977) (0.10%, presumption of intoxication); UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6-44 (Supp. 1981) (0.08%,
presumption of intoxication); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 1204 (Supp. 1982) (0.10%, presumption of
intoxication); VA. CODE § 18.2-269 (1982) (0.10%, presumption of intoxication); WASH. REv. CODE
ANN. § 46.61.506 (1970) (0.10%, presumption of intoxication); W. VA. CODE § 172(331a) (1961)
(0.15%, prima facie evidence of intoxication); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 885.235 (West Supp. 1982)
(0.10%, presumption of intoxication); Wyo. STAT. § 31-5-233 (1977) (0.10%, presumption of
intoxication).
10. Hitch, 12 Cal. 3d at 644, 527 P.2d at 363, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 11.
11. Id. at 645, 527 P.2d at 364, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 12.
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the test ampoule, its contents, and the reference ampoule constitute
material evidence pertaining to a defendant's guilt. 12 The Hitch
court declared that it would impose sanctions for the intentional,
though nonmalicious, destruction of ampoules. 13 The court stated
that the only permissible exception to the promulgated rule of
preservation and disclosure occurs when the prosecution can prove
that governmental agencies attempted, in good faith, to adhere to
the procedures designed to preserve the ampoules. 14
In reaching its conclusion the Hitch court relied on the trial
court's detailed findings of fact. 1 5 Those findings concluded that the
ampoules were indeed retestable and that the retesting would
produce reliable results. 16 Since the Hitch decision, courts faced
with this issue have reached divergent results. A minority of courts
follow Hitch.' 7 Most courts, however, have held that ampoules are
not discoverable.' 8 The Hitch decision thus invites consideration of
12. Id. at 652. 527 P.2d at 369, 117 Cal. 1Rptr. at 17. The Hitch court found the ampoules to be
material evidence because of the presumption of legal intoxication upon a breathalyzer reading of
0.10% blood alcohol. Id. at 647, 527 P.2d at 365, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 13.
13. Id. at 652, 527 P.2d at 369, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 17.
14. Id. at 652-53, 527 P.2d at 369, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 17.
15. Id. at 645 n. 1,527 P.2d at 364 n. 1, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 12 n.1.
16. Id. The court summarized the trial court's findings of fact as follows:
I I t is always possible to retest the ampoule and contents to determine if it conforms to
specilications and if it contained the requisite three cubic centimeters of solution; that
it is always possible to determine whether there was in fact a 0.025 percent potassium
dichromnate solution; that optical defects in the glass of the test ampoule and of the
reference ampoule may have an effect on the accuracy of the test; and that the
accuracy ofa retest will depend upon factors such as the time elapsed since the actual
test, the manner in which the test ampoule and solution have been stored, and the
continued chemical change in the contents ofthe test ampoule and that upon a retest
the original test cannot be duplicated with 100 percent accuracy.
Id.
17. The Ibllowing cases have adopted the position that ampoules are discoverable: Lauderdale
v. State, 548 P.2d 376 (Alaska 1976); Scales v. City Court, 122 Ariz. 231, 594 P.2d 97 (1979); Garcia
v. District Court. 197 Colo. 38, 589 P.2d 924 (1979); People v. Richter, 102 Misc. 2d 285, 423
N.Y.S.2d 610 (Crim. Ct. 1979); State v. Michener, 25 Or. App. 523, 550 P.2d 449 (Ct. App. 1976);
State v. Booth, 98 Wis. 2d 20, 295 N.W.2d 194 (Ct. App. 1980).
18. The Ibllowing cases have not adopted the position that ampoules are discoverable: State v.
Cantu, 116 Ariz. 356, 569 P.2d 298 (Ct. App. 1977) (ampoule not discoverable because request for
ampoule was made 85 days after breathalyzer test); People v. Hedrick, 192 Colo. 37, 557 P.2d 378
(1976) (ampoule not discoverable because request for ampoule was made nearly three months after
breathalyzer test): People v. Godbout, 42 I11. App. 3d 1001, 356 N.E.2d 865 (App. Ct. 1976)
(ampoule not discoverable because defendant presented insufficient proof of ampoule retestability);
State v. Southerburg, 402 A.2d 1294 (Me. 1979) (ampoule not discoverable because Kozelka-Hine
gas chromatograph machine was used and the chemicals were consumed during the test); People v.
Stark, 73 Mich. App. 332, 251 N.W.2d 574 (Ct. App. 1977) (ampoule not discoverable because
discovery request was made 72 days after breathalyzer test); State v. Preston, 585 S.W.2d 569 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1979) (ampoule not discoverable because defendant presented insufficient proof that
retesting ampoule would produce exculpatory evidence); State v. Shutt, 116 N.H. 495, 363 A.2d 406
(1976) (ampoule not discoverable because defendant presented insufficient proof that retesting
ampoule would produce material evidence); State v. Teare, 129 NJ. Super. 562, 324 A.2d 131
(Essex County Ct. 1974), rev'd, 133 N.J. Super. 338, 336 A.2d 496 (Super. Ct. App. Div.), af'd, 13i
N.J. Super. 19, 342 A.2d 556 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1975) (ampoule not discoverable because
defendant presented insufficient proof that ampoule, once used, was retestable); People v. LePree,
105 Misc. 2d 1066, 430 N.Y.S.2d 778 (Ct. Cl. 1980) (ampoule not discoverable because defendant
presented insufficient proof that retesting ampoule would produce material evidence); State v.
Larson, 313 N.W.2d 750 (N.D. 1981) (ampoule not discoverable because defendant presented
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general criminal discovery principles and of decisions regarding the
discovery of ampoules.
B. DISCOVERY IN CRIMINAL CASES: THE BRADY-AGURS TEST
At common law discovery was not permitted in criminal
cases. 19 Criminal discovery started in England in the 1830S20 and
came to the United States some years later.21 The principles of
discovery in criminal cases as recognized by the legal profession
today were largely established in the United States Supreme Court
case of Brady v. Maryland.22 In Brady the Court allowed discovery
when necessary to protect a defendant's constitutional right to due
process. 23 After Brady the promulgation of statutes and court rules
also fostered disclosure by permitting discovery in criminal cases.
24
The federal government and most states have adopted these
statutes and rules. 25 A common feature of the statutes and rules,
however, is that they are applicable only to discovery of tangible
things still in the government's possession. 26 Because breathalyzer
test ampoules are usually discarded after a test, the rules and
insufficient proof that retesting would produce material evidence); State v. Watson, 48 Ohio App. 2d
110, 355 N.E.2d 883 (Ct. App. 1975) (ampoule not discoverable because defendant presented
insufficient proof that retesting ampoule would produce material evidence); Edwards v. State, 544
P.2d 60 (Okla. Crim. App. 1975), aff'd sub noma. Edwards v. Oklahoma, 429 F. Supp. 668 (W.D.
Okla. 1976) (no constitutional error absent a showing that ampoule retesting would establish a
reasonable doubt); State v. Reaves, 25 Or. App. 745, 550 P.2d 1403 (Ct. App. 1976) (ampoule not
discoverable because defendant failed to prove that retesting the ampoule would produce favorable
evidence); State v. Newton, 274 S.C. 287, 262 S.E.2d 906 (1980) (ampoule not discoverable because
defendant failed to prove that retesting the ampoule would provide reliable results); State v. Helmer,
2)8N.W.2d 808 (S.D. 1979) (retesting ampoules cannot constitute exculpatory evidence and
cannot, therefore, be material); Turpin v. State, 606 S.W.2d 907 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980) (right to
obtain independent test protects due process rights); State v. Canaday, 90 Wash. 2d 808, 585 P.2d
1185 (1978) (routine destruction and disposal of used breathalyzer test ampoules does not violate due
process).
19. See2 L. ORFIELD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE UNDER THE FEDERAL RULES § 16:3 (1966).
20. See id.
2 1. See id. § 16:5.
22. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). For a discussion of the principles of Brady, see
infra text accompanying notes 28-33.
23. 373 U.S. at 87. The United States Supreme Court held in Brady that "suppression iby the
prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process rights where
evidence is material either to guilt or punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the
prosecution." Id. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (no state shall "deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law").
24. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a) (disclosure of evidence by the government); N.D.R. CRtM.
P. 16 (a) (discovery and inspection).
25. See, e.g., N.D.R. CRtM. P. 16(a).
26. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIt. P. 16 (a) (1) (C). Rule 16 (a) (1) (C) provides as follows:
Upon request of the defendant the government shall permit the defendant to
inspect and copy or photograph books, papers, documents, photographs, tangible
objects, buildings or places, or copies or portions thereof, which are within the
possession, custody or control of the government, and which are material to the
preparation of his defense or are intended for use by the government as evidence in
chief at the trial, or were obtained from or belong to the defendant.
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statutes generally are useless in breathalyzer cases. 27 Accordingly,
this Article emphasizes the requirements of Brady and the
constitutional dimension of discovery in criminal cases.
In Brady the defendant appealed his first-degree murder
conviction. 28 At trial the defendant admitted to participating in the
murder, but claimed that his companion had done the actual
killing.29 Defendant's counsel had requested from the prosecution
the extrajudicial statements of the companion. 30 The prosecution,
though giving defendant's counsel some of the statements, withheld
the statement in which the companion admitted that he, not the
defendant, had actually killed the victim.
31
The United States Supreme Court held that when an accused
made a specific request for information, prosecutorial suppression
of the requested evidence was a denial of the accused's right to due
process of law. 32 The Court concluded that "suppression by the
prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request
violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or
punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the
prosecution." 33 Brady was refined in the subsequent United States
Supreme Court decision of United States v. Agurs.34
In Agurs the defendant, after a brief interlude in a motel room,
repeatedly stabbed James Sewell. 35 The defendant claimed that she
acted in self-defense, even though she received no physical
injuries. 36 After being convicted of second-degree murder, the
defendant moved for a new trial, alleging that the prosecutor's
failure to inform her of Sewell's prior convictions materially
harmed her self-defense claim. 37 The district court denied her
motion for a new trial, stating that the undisclosed evidence of
Sewell's prior convictions was not material evidence. 38 The district
court noted that there was evidence at trial that Sewell had two
27. See 2 C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 254, at 64 (1982) ("government
cannot be required to disclose evidence that does not exist nor evidence that it does not have or
control").
28. Brady, 373 U.S. at 88.
29. Id. at 84.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 87.
33. Id. In reaching its decision the Brady Court shifted from concern for the prosecutor's
misbehavior to the harm to the defendant resulting from nondisclosure of certain evidence. Id. See
United States v. Agurs. 427 U.S. 97, 104 n.10 (1976). The Court in Agurs stated that "[i]f the
suppression of evidence results in constitutional error, it is because of the character of the evidence.
not the character of the prosecutor." Id. at 110.
34. 427 U.S. 97 (1976).
35. United States v. Agurs. 427 U.S. 97.98 (1976).
36. Id. at 100.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 101-02.
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knives and that the defendant's self-defense claim was inconsistent
with Sewell's fatal injuries and the defendant's lack of injury. 39 The
court of appeals disagreed, finding that the nondisclosed evidence
was material. 40 The United States Supreme Court reversed the
court of appeals decision, holding that the prosecution's failure to
provide the defendant with Sewell's criminal record did not deprive
her of her constitutional right to due process.
41
In Agurs the Court stated that prosecutorial disclosure is not
required unless the omission would result in a denial of the
defendant's right to a fair trial. 42 Rather than absolute disclosure,
due process requires disclosure of "material" evidence.
43
Furthermore, materiality under Agurs is not evidentiary
materiality, but materiality in the constitutional sense.44 -The Court
in Agurs stated that evidence is constitutionally material if its
omission "creates a reasonable doubt that did not otherwise
exist." ,45 The Court added that it would evaluate the omission with
respect to the entire record.
46
Accordingly, Brady and Agurs provide a rule of constitutional
law permitting criminal discovery if the defendant can establish
four elements: his request is for specific evidence; 47 the specific
evidence is, or has been, in the prosecutor's possession; the
requested evidence is favorable to him; and the evidence is material
to his guilt or punishment. 48 These four elements lay the theoretical
foundation of the defendant's constitutional right to discovery.
39. Id. at 102.
40. Id.
41. Id. See U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall.., be deprived oflife, liberty, or property,
without due process oflaw .... .
42. 427 U.S. at 108.
43. Id. at 106.
44. Id. at 107.
45. Id. at 112. The Agurs Court explained its acceptance of the materiality standard by
discussing the problems of using another standard. Id. at 112 n.20. The Court rejected a standard
that would require a court to examine "the impact of the undisclosed evidence on the defendant's
ability to prepare for trial." Id. The latter standard, according to the Court, presented two problems:
The standard would include both incriminating and exculpatory evidence, and it would change the
traditional interpretation of due process notice by requiring the Court to examine notice of
evidentiary support for the charge rather than notice of the charge alone. Id.
46. Id. at 112.
47. Id. at 106-07. The Court in Agurs stated that a request for specific evidence need not be made
when evidence is obviously exculpatory. Id. The Court used the extreme example of fingerprint
evidence that proves the defendant could not have fired the fatal shot. Id. at 110 n.18. To be
cautious, lawyers should request, however, what may seem to be "obvious" exculpatory evidence.
48. Id. at 106-14; Brady, 373 U.S. at 87. Discussion ofthe procedure for discovery in a DWI case
assumes that the breathalyzer test results will be admissible at trial. In North Dakota the
foundational requirements for introduction of test results are that the test was (1) fairly administered;
(2) performed according to the methods and with devices approved by the state toxicologist; and (3)
performed by an individual possessing a certificate of qualification to administer the test issued by
the state toxicologist. State v. Ghylin, 248 N.W.2d 825, 830 (N.D. 1976). See Keel v. State, 609 P.2d
555, 558 (Alaska 1980) (State's failure to prove proper calibration precluded admission of test
results). Butsee Sullivan v. Municipality of Anchorage, 577 P.2d 1070 (Alaska 1978) (results of blood
test performed at hospital admissible notwithstanding State's failure to show how and by whom the
blood was handled).
19831
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1. Requirement That Defendant Make a Specific Request
In a DWI prosecution the defendant easily satisfies the first
requirement, a request for specific evidence, 49 because he is usually
interested in discovering the breathalyzer test and reference
ampoules. A defendant also should request evidence of the proper
functioning of the breathalyzer,50 the operator's qualifications, 51
the breathalyzer "checklist," ' 52 and the video or audio tapes of the
defendant performing sobriety or breathalyzer tests.53
2. Requirement That Evidence Is in Prosecutor's Possession
The second element of the Brady-Agurs test, that evidence was
in the possession of the prosecution at some time,5 4 is also easily
met. The Hitch court discussed this requirement, stating that "the
duty of disclosure attaches in some form once the Government has
first gathered and taken possession of the evidence in question."55
The court emphasized that "the duty of disclosure is operative as a duty of
preservation. "56
If the duty to disclose attaches when the government takes
control of the evidence, this duty should not be thwarted by the
police suppressing the evidence. Accordingly, when the
government takes control of evidence, the courts should find that
the evidence is in the prosecutor's possession.
Less easily satisfied are the other two requirements of the
Brady-Agurs test, that the requested evidence is favorable and that
49. See 427 U.S. at 101 n.4. The Agurs Court quotes the district court's record, which reveals
that an attorney must specifically request evidence. Id.
50. See, e.g., State v. Ghylin, 248 N.W.2d 825 (N.D. 1976) (one element of a proper foundation
for the use of test results is proof that the breathalyzer was in proper working order).
North Dakota law provides that upon request, full information about tests performed at the
direction of a law enforcement officer shall be made available to the person tested. N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 39-20-02 (1979).
51. See, e.g., State v. Entze, 272 N.W.2d 292 (N.D. 1978) (for the test results to be admissible,
the State must show that the operator possessed a certificate'qualifying him to administer the test).
52. See, e.g., State v. Ghylin, 248 N.W.2d 825 (N.D. 1976) (test must be performed according to
methods approved by a state toxicologist).
53. See, e.g., State v. Peters, 39 Or. App. 109, 591 P.2d 761 (Ct. App. 1979); Seattle v. Fettig,
10 Wash. App. 773, 519 P.2d 1002 (1974). In Fettig the negligent destruction of a video tape of the
defendant performing a sobriety test violated the defendant's due process rights when the defendant
showed by a "reasonable possibility" that the tape would cast doubt on the police testimony and
would support the defendant's testimony. 10 Wash. App. at 776, 519 P.2d at 1005. In Peters, an
audio tape was discoverable under Oregon's discovery statute. 39 Or. App. at -, 591 P.2d at 762.
The court in Peters noted, however, that the material was not discoverable under a constitutional
claim because the defendant failed to show that the requested evidence was favorable or material to
his guilt or punishment. Id. at ., 591 P.2d at 763.
54. See Brady, 373 U.S. at 87. The Brady Court implies the presence of the second element, that
evidence is or has been in the prosecution's possession, when it ignores the good faith of the
prosecution in failing to disclose evidence. Id.
55. Hitch, 12 Cal. 3d at 650, 527 P.2d at 367, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 15.
56. Id. (emphasis in original). A court's reluctance to require police and prosecutors to
recognize their duty to preserve and disclose ampoules appears to relegate the due process guarantees
of Brady and Agurs to an empty promise.
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the requested evidence is material to the defendant's guilt or
punishment. 57 The difficulty in meeting these two requirements has
prompted most courts to refuse to follow the California Supreme
Court's decision in Hitch.
58
3. Requirement That Evidence Is Favorable
In Hitch the court sought a principle that would aid it in
determining whether the destruction of ampoules denied a
defendant his right to disclosure of favorable evidence. 59 The court
decided that an analogous situation was the failure or refusal of the
prosecution to identify an informant. 60  To establish the
prosecution's duty to identify an informant, the Hitch court noted
that a defendant is required to demonstrate " 'a reasonable
possibility that the anonymous informant . . . could give evidence
on the issue of guilt which might result in exoneration.' "61
The same rationale applies to DWI prosecutions. The Hitch
court recognized that "if, given the availability of the test ampoule
and its contents, and the reference ampoule, there is a reasonable
possibility that they would constitute favorable evidence on the issue
of guilt or innocence, then such evidence must be disclosed. "62
Other courts presented with the discovery question in DWI cases
also have decided whether lost,-destroyed, or suppressed ampoules
constitute favorable evidence.
In State v. Michener63 the Oregon Court of Appeals addressed
claims that the destruction of breathalyzer test ampoules deprived
the defendants of their due process rights. 64 Concerning whether
the ampoule was favorable to the defendants, the court stated that
Brady65 "requires disclosure of material evidence where a defendant
establishes some reasonable possibility, based on concrete evidence
rather than a fertile imagination, that it would be favorable to his
cause.' '66
The rule in Michener requiring a "reasonable possibility" of
favorableness was expressly adopted by North Dakota.67 In State v.
Larson68 the defendant claimed that destruction of the ampoule used
57. SeeAgurs, 427 U.S. at 112-13; Brady, 373 U.S. at 87.
58. For a list of courts that have not followed the Hitch rule, see supra note 18.
59. Hitch, 12 Cal. 3d at 648, 527 P.2d at 366, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 14.
60. Id. at 648-49, 527 P.2d at 366, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 14.
61. Id. at 649, 527 P.2d at 366, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 14 (citations omitted by the court).
62. Id. at 649, 527 P.2d at 367, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 15 (emphasis added).
63. 25 Or. App. 523, 550 P.2d 449 (Ct. App. 1976).
64. State v. Michener, 25 Or. App. 523. -, 550 P.2d 449, 450 (Ct. App. 1976).
65. See Brady, 373 U.S. at 87.
66. Michener, 25 Or. App. at-, 550 P.2d at 454.
67. SeeState v. Larson, 313 N.W.2d 750, 756 (N.D. 1981).
68. 313 N.W.2d 750 (N.D. 1981).
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during his breathalyzer test denied him due process of law. 69 The
North Dakota Supreme Court ruled in Larson that the defendant
failed to demonstrate that the ampoules, if available, would have
provided material evidence favorable to the defendant at trial.70
Nonetheless, by clear implication, the court in Larson made it
known that to successfully further a constitutional discovery claim
the defendant must establish that the requested evidence has a
reasonable possibility of being favorable. 7
In contrast to the Hitch and Michener decisions, several courts
have established more stringent standards for showing
favorableness. 72 For example, in State v. Helmer"3 the South Dakota
Supreme Court equated the Agurs requirement of "favorable
evidence" to "exculpatory evidence."74 Defining "exculpatory"
as "clearing or tending to clear from alleged fault or guilt, '" 5 the
court in Helmer concluded that an ampoule, even if available and
retestable, could only be used to challenge the credibility of the
breathalyzer machine or its operation. 76 With this narrow view of
admissibility a court would never find an ampoule to be
exculpatory evidence. 77  An ampoule simply would not be
discoverable pursuant to the due process concerns developed in
Brady and Agurs.
If a court adopts the Helmer court's semantic distinction
between favorable and exculpatory evidence, no defendant could
meet the Brady-Agurs requirements. No defendant could thus
compel discovery. By taking this position a court forecloses attack
on the breathalyzer, even when it is the only evidence of
intoxication. A more tenable idea, as suggested by one student
comment, 78 would be to permit discovery of impeaching or
69. State v. Larson, 313 N.W.2d 750, 752 (N.D. 1981).
70. Id. at 755-56. One court defined "favorable evidence" as that which would lead juries to
entertain reasonable doubt about a defendant's guilt. People v. Richter, 102 Misc. 2d 285, 423
N.Y.S.2d 610, 613 (Grim. Ct. 1979). The Colorado Supreme Court, however, adopted a standard
less stringent than favorableness. Garcia v. District Court, 197 Colo. 38, -, 589 P.2d 924, 929
(1979). The Garcia court required that the requested evidence should not be merely "incidental" to
the prosecution's case or to the defendant's affirmative defense. Id. The defendant must state only
that the requested material might be favorable. Id.
71. 313 N.W.2d at 756.
72. See, e.g., State v. Canaday, 90 Wash. 2d 808, 585 P.2d 1185 (1978) (constitutional error
occurs when nondisclosed evidence would create a reasonable doubt that otherwise did not exist).
73. 278 N.W.2d 808 (S.D. 1979).
74. State v. Helmer, 278 N.W.2d 808, 811 (S.D. 1979).
75. Id. at 811-12 (quoting BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 508 (5th ed. 1979)).
76. 278 N.W.2d at 812 (citing, for example, Edwards v. Oklahoma, 544 P.2d 60 (Okla. Grim.
App.) (retesting of evidence can only attack credibility of the operator's performance and the test's
results, not the defendant's guilt), habeas corpus petition denied, 429 F. Supp. 668 (W.D. Okla. 1976)).
77. 278 N.W.2d at 812. The court in Helmer stated that "exculpatory" evidence is that which
extrinsically negates guilt or supports the innocence of the accused, while favorable evidence is
collateral or impeaching; the former compels discovery, while the latter does not. Id.
78. Comment, Breathalyzers: Should the State Be Required to Preserve the Ampoules?, 15 LAND & WATER
L. REV. 299 (1980).
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"favorable" evidence when the breathalyzer test is the only
evidence against the accused. 79 This rule, however, is better left as
a second choice. The preferred view is the rule developed in
Michener,80 which recognized that due process requirements are
fulfilled if the accused can show a reasonable possibility that the
evidence sought to be discovered is favorable. 81 Yet, the discussion
of favorableness is only part of the constitutional hurdle; the Court
in Brady and Agurs also required that the defendant establish that
the requested evidence is material. 
8 2
4. Requirement That Evidence Is Material
In Brady and Agurs the Court held that a prosecutor's
constitutional duty to disclose arises upon a showing of
materiality. 83 The Court did not define materiality, but in Agurs the
Court did specify what is not materiality. 84 The Agurs Court stated
that "[t]he mere possibility that an item of undisclosed information
might have helped the defense, or might have affected the outcome
of the trial, does not establish 'materiality' in the constitutional
sense. "85 The Court also stated that unless the prosecutor's
nondisclosure "deprived the defendant of a fair trial, there was no
constitutional violation requiring that the verdict be set aside; and
absent a constitutional violation, there was no breach of the
prosecutor's constitutional duty to disclose." 8 6
In Hitch the California Supreme Court also expressly
recognized the requirement of materiality.8 7 It held that because
the results of the breathalyzer test give rise to a presumption of
legal intoxication, "the results of the breathalyzer test by their very
nature constitute material evidence on the issue of guilt or
innocence upon a charge of drunk driving. "88 Other courts have
reached the same result using similar reasoning. 89
79. Id. at 302.
80. See State v. Michener, 25 Or. App. 523. 550 P.2d 449 (Ct. App. 1976).
81. Id. at 532. 550 P.2d at 454.
82. Agurs. 427 U.S. at 109-10: Brady. 373 U.S. at 87.
83. Agurs. 427 U.S. at 109-10: Brad). 373 U.S. at 87.
84. 427 U.S. at 109-10.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 108.
87. Hitch. 12 Cal. 3d at 647, 527 P.2d at 365. 117 Cal. Rptr. at 13.
88. Id. (emphasis in original). The California Supreme Court in Hitch based its conclusion on
federal and California discovery cases that found that the suppression of evidence bearing on the
credibility of key witnesses was suppression of material evidence. Id. (referring to Giglio v. United
States. 405 U.S. 150 (1972): In re Ferguson. 5 Cal. 3d 525. 487 P.2d 1234.96 Cal. Rptr. 5941197 1)).
89. See. e.g.. Scales v. City Court. 122 Ariz. 231. . 594 P.2d 97. 100 (1980) (destruction of
ampoules is prejudicial to the defense): Garcia v. District Court. 197 Colo. 38. 46. 589 P.2d 924, 929
(1979) (when ampoules are destroyed. a defendant can merelh assert that the ampoules might have
been favorable).
1983]
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 59:369
The apparent reason for the materiality holding in Hitch is that
without the ampoule, a defendant cannot rebut the breathalyzer
results. 90 Without the ability to attack the results, a defendant
cannot rebut the presumption of intoxication.9 Destruction of the
ampoule would therefore deprive a defendant of his right to due
process.
Other courts, however, have found that the results of ampoule
retesting are not sufficiently reliable to be admissible in court.
92
These courts have adopted the position that if scientific retesting of
the ampoules cannot produce admissible evidence, then the
ampoules themselves cannot rise to the level of material evidence.
93
In State v. Canaday9" the Washington Supreme Court con-
sidered whether the destruction of breathalyzer ampoules denied
defendants their due process rights. 95 The court stated that the first
issue was whether the used ampoule could be used to impeach the
breathalyzer results. 96 Impeachment would apparently require
expert testimony from the scientist who analyzed the used
ampoule. 97 A threshold question is whether the expert's testimony
would be admissible at trial. 98
The traditional test99 for whether scientific tests are admissible
at trial was established in Frye v. United States. 100 The Fye standard
requires that the scientific principles upon which the expert's
testimony are based must be sufficiently established to have gained
general acceptance in the particular field. 101
90. See Hitch, 12 Cal. 3d at 654, 527 P.2d at 370, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 18.
91. Id.
92. See, e.g., State v. Canaday, 90 Wash. 2d 808,-, 585 P.2d 1185, 1188 (1978).
93. See, e.g., State v. Larson, 313 N.W.2d 750, 753-56 (N.D. 1981).
94. 90 Wash. 2d 808, 585 P.2d 1185 (1978).
95. Id. at-., 585 P.2d at 1186.
96. Id. at-, 585 P.2d at 1187.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at -, 585 P.2d at 1188. But see FED. R. EVID. 702. Rule 702 provides that "Jilf
scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the
evidence ... a witness qualifed as an expert ... may testify thereto..." Id. SeealsoJ. WEINSTEIN,
EVIDENCE 702[03] (1982). Professor Weinstein states that "[a] number of . . . courts have
responded to the enactment of Rule 702 by rejecting the Fye standard,-but . . . a number of the
[courts] still predicate the admission of scientific evidence on general acceptance in the community."
Id. Those courts that reject the Frye standard determine whether the scientific evidence will be
admissible based upon a determination of the evidence's relevancy and prejudice. Id. Whether or not
the scientific principles involved have been generally accepted by experts in the field may still have a
bearing on the reliability and probative value of the evidence. Id. A test unable to gain any support
within the scientific community will be found unreliable by the court. Id. (emphasis in original).
N.D.R. EVID. 702, construed in South v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 290 N.W.2d 819 (N.D.
1980) (expert testimony is admissible where the matters are not within the common knowledge of the
jurors and the tetimony will assist them in understanding concepts helpful to a determination of fact);
State v. Larson, 313 N.W.2d 750 (N.D. 1981) (courts will not take judicial notice of a fact that has
not been accepted in the scientific community).
100. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
101. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923). The Fye court explained the
difficulty in determining the standard for admitting expert testimony as follows:
380
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The Washington Supreme Court in Canaday'0 2 applied the Frye
standard and held that substantial evidence supported the lower
court's finding that ampoule retesting procedures had not achieved
general acceptance in the scientific community. 10 3 Accordingly,
the Washington Supreme Court concluded that expert testimony
regarding the retesting of breathalyzer ampoules was not
admissible evidence. 
10 4
Similarly, in State v. Teare0 5 the defendant moved to suppress
evidence of the breathalyzer test results when the state failed to
produce the breathalyzer test ampoule. 1 06 In support of his motion,
the defendant produced a chemist who testified that qualitative and
quantitative factors, such as the chemical contents and the
characteristics of the test and reference ampoules, had a direct
bearing on the validity of the breathalyzer test results. 10 7 The trial
court agreed with the defendant and suppressed the evidence. 108
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the experimental
and demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in this twilight zone the
evidential force of the principle must be recognized, and while courts will go a long
way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle
or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently
established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it
belongs.
Id. The apparent rationale behind the Frye standard is to ensure that finders of fact are presented with
specialized knowledge only when the proponent of that kncwledge can show reliability. Reliability
exists when a scientific community accepts the scientific theory underpinning the opinion. See United
States v. Franks, 511 F.2d 25, 33 (6th Cir. 1975) (trial judge has considerable discretion in admitting
or refusing to admit evidence based on scientific processes).
102. See State v. Canaday, 90 Wash. 2d 808, 585 P.2d 1185 (1978).
103. Id. at ., 585 P.2d at 1188.
104. Id. In concluding that the retesting of ampoules was not admissible, the court in Canaday
noted that decisions holding ampoules to be discoverable have not addressed the admissibility of
expert testimony regarding the retesting of ampoules. Id. See People v. Hitch, 12 Cal. 3d 641, 527
P.2d 361, 117 Cal. Rptr. 9 (1974); State v. Michener, 25 Or. App. 523, 550 P.2d 449 (Ct. App.
1976).
105. 129 N.J. Super. 562, 324 A.2d 131 (Essex County Ct. 1974) rev'd, 133 N.J. Super. 338,
336 A.2d 496 (Super. Ct. App. Div.), aff'd, 135 N.J. Super. 19, 342 A.2d 556 (Super. Ct. App. Div.
1975).
106. State v. Teare, 129 NJ. Super. 562, -, 324 A.2d 131, 132 (Essex County Ct. 1974),
rev'd, 133 NJ. Super. 338, 336 A.2d 496 (Super. Ct. App. Div.), aff'd, 135 N.J. Super. 19, 342 A.2d
556 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1975).
107. 129 NJ. Super. at-., 324 A.2d at 132-33.
108. Id. at __ , 324 A.2d at 133. The trial court's findings of fact were as follows:
1. The exact volume of the ampule is critical to the accuracy of the test and the
exact volume can later be determined by independent test of the ampule.
2. The alcoholic content of the ampule is converted into acetic acid by a chemical
reaction.
3. The amount of acetic acid can later be determined by means of a chemical
procedure known as Vapor Phase Chromatography (VPC).
4. By means ofVPC a qualitative and quantitative analysis of the contents of the
ampule can be later determined.
5. By determining the amount of acetic acid in an ampule the amount of blood
alcohol in the person tested can later be determined.
6. In order to prevent deterioration of the contents of a test ampule for later
examination, it should be stored in an amber-colored bottle to prevent light from
entering, and tightly capped to prevent oxidation.
7. If properly stored, the contents of a test ampule would not deteriorate within a
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On appeal the New Jersey Superior Court remanded the Teare
case for evidentiary hearings on the feasibility of preserving the
ampoules. 0 9 The court further ordered that if the ampoules were
found to be preservable, the trial court must also determine
whether scientifically useful data could be derived from retesting
them."10
On remand the trial court conducted a hearing and found that
the ampoules could not be preserved, that they could not be
accurately retested, and that the theories relied upon by the
defendant's expert had not been generally accepted by the scientific
community.""
On a second appeal the New Jersey Superior Court held that
the trial court's second findings of fact were supported by
substantial evidence and must be upheld. 112 Thus, through
application of the Fye standard the courts in Teare concluded that
the ampoules were not sufficiently retestable to constitute material
evidence. "13
The feasibility of retesting ampoules also has been addressed
by the Supreme Court of North Dakota. 114 In State v. Larson 1" 5 two
questions were certified to the North Dakota Supreme Court from a
county court of increased jurisdiction. 116 The first question was
whether the state must, at the time of the breathalyzer test,
preserve a sample of the defendant's breath. 117 The court answered
reasonable period of time.
8. Because the test reading of the breathalyzer is made shortly alter the ampule is
breathed into, the chemical reaction of alcohol to acetic acid has not been fully
completed at the time of the test reading. A reading or other test taken at a later time
would be likely to have a slightly higher reading. Therefore, if the later test were to
show a result less than or equal to the test conducted by the police officer, this second
test result would at least rebut the prima facie presumption raised by the breathalyzer
test.
9. The amount ofsulphuric acid in the ampule is critical to the accuracy of the test
and this amount can later be determined.
10. Because breathalyzer apparatus can be calibrated to correct itself for certain
inaccuracies in the ampules, an expert would need both the test ampule and the
relrence ampule at a later examination to be certain that the breathalyzer test was
accurate.
Id. at __ 324 A.2d at 132-33.
1 09. 133 N.J. Super. at . 336 A.2d at 497.
110. Id. The prosecutor in the first trial failed to present expert testimony rebutting the
defendant's claim that the ampoules were retestable. Id. In view of the fact that the trial court already
fbund the ampoules to be retestable. the appellate court remanded the case to give the prosecutor a
second opportunity to prove that preservation of test ampoules is not feasible or practical. Id.
111. 135 N.J. Super. at -. , 342 A.2d at 558.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. SeeState v. Larson, 313 N.W.2d 750 (N.D. 1981).
115. 313 N.W.2d 750 (N.D. 1981).
116. State v. Larson, 313 N.W.2d 750, 751 (N.D. 1981). Chapter 32-24 of the North Dakota
Century Code permits a trial court to certify questions involving the interpretation or construction of
the law. N.D. CENT. CODE §32-24-01 (Supp. 1981).
117. 313 N.W.2d at 752.
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in the negative, holding that the failure to preserve a breath sample
did not deprive the defendant of his due process right to a fair
trial.'1 8 The court found two facts to support its holding: the
breathalyzer machine was not equipped to store or produce a
separate breath sample' 19 and the defendant was statutorily
entitled to obtain independent breath, blood, or urine tests.120
The second question certified to the court in Larson was
whether the state was required to produce the test ampoule for the
defendant's independent testing.' 21 The court held that the state
need not preserve the used test ampoule. 122 It employed the Brady
standard and stated that, as applied to the facts in Larson, the defen-
dant's due process rights had not been violated by the destruction
of the ampoule.' 23 The court determined that the defendant had
failed to establish that the ampoules could be scientifically retested,
and if retestable, that they would produce favorable and material
evidence. 124 The court stated that it could not take judicial notice of
the fact that ampoules could be retested. 125 It found that the scien-
tific community had not so clearly accepted the proposition that
retesting could either support or challenge the results of a
breathalyzer examination that judicial notice could be taken of the
fact. 126 Accordingly, the court declared that the proponent of the
discovery claim bears the burden of establishing retestability as a
preliminary step to proving materiality. 127
In Larson the only evidence of retestability was a state forensic
toxicologist's deposition. 2 8 The toxicologist testified that an am-
poule could not be analyzed to produce evidence reflecting upon
the accuracy of the test. 129 The defendant offered no evidence to
118. Id. at 753.
119. Id. at 755.
120. Id. at 752-53. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-20-02 (1980). The statute provides as follows:
The person tested may have a physician, or a qualified technician, chemist, registered
nurse, or other qualified person of his own choosing administer a chemical test or tests
in addition to any administered at the direction of a law enforcement officer. The
failure or inability to obtain an additional tebt by a person shall not precluue the
admission of the test or tests taken at the direction of law enforcement officer.
Id.
121. 313 N.W.2d at 753.
122. Id. at 756.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 753-56.
125. Id. at 755 (citing State v. Bryan, 133 N.J. Super. 369, 336 A.2d 511 (Super. Ct. Law Div.
1974); Edwards v. Oklahoma, 544 P.2d 60 (Okla. Crim. App. 1975)).
126. 313 N.W.2d at 755.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. The Larson court supported its conclusion that the State has no duty to preserve an
ampoule by quoting as follows from the toxicologist's deposition:
19831
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rebut the toxicologist's opinion. 130 The Larson court concluded that
the defendant had failed to prove that retesting an ampoule could
produce material evidence that challenged the accuracy of the test
results.' 3 ' The defendant therefore failed to meet the materiality
requirement of Brady.132 Accordingly, the court held that the state
was not required to preserve, nor to produce upon request, the
ampoule used in the defendant's breathalyzer test. 133
The Larson court's holding suggests three conclusions. First,
the court has not foreclosed new attempts to establish that ampoules
"A. As far as I am concerned to correlate back a later analysis to the amount of alcohol
in a person's breath would be absolutely meaningless.
"A. The ampoule when it is received is a sealed glass vial. You break off the glass vial,
the only effective way to save this ampoule would be to seal that glass vial up with a
cutting torch or glass blowing type torch which would be impossible. The way the
ampoule is shaped has destroyed the neck of the ampoule and would be impossible to
draw the glass back out to seal it up.
"A. Again, the analysis of the components of the ampoule could be redone, the
volume could be remeasured, all of these would have absolutely no effect or no value as
far as interpreting back a Breathalyzer result or a blood alcohol concentration at the
time of the test.
"Q. Your insistence that it is really not scientifically feasible to keep the test ampoule
and run tests as to volume and so forth as we have discussed leads me to ask you this
question: Do you then state that there is no way that the test ampoule once used could
be tested again or could be measured again?
"A. Oh, not at all.
"Q. To accurately measure volume?
"A. Not at all.
"Q. It could be then?
"A. Yes, sir.
"Q. All right. How about measuring the glass itself or testing the glass itself or optical
defects, could that be done again?
"A. If you so desired.
"Q. All right, How about the proportion then of the chemicals contained in the
ampoule?
"A. Could do that too.
'Q. But you would need access to the particular ampoule used if you were going to
make those tests?
"A. If you were to perform the tests which you have just described there would be no
wavy of determining that back to whether or not an accurate Breathalyzer test had been
administered.'
Id.
130. Id. In fairness to defense counsel it must be noted that the record was sparse because the
certified questions went to the supreme court before trial on the merits. See id. at 754.
131. Id. at 755.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 756.
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are discoverable. 134 Second, defendants who argue that they are
constitutionally entitled to discovery of the ampoules have the bur-
den of showing, with a "reasonable possibility," that retesting the
ampoules can, and would, produce favorable evidence. 135 Finally,
defendants must establish constitutional materiality by proving that
recognized scientific procedures produce reliable retesting
results. 136
Clearly, it is incumbent upon defense counsel to meet the four
requirements of Brady. 137 The requirements most easily satisfied are
a request for specific evidence and proof that the evidence is, or
was, in the prosecutor's possession. 138
The third requirement, favorableness, can be satisfied by
showing a reasonable possibility that the requested evidence is
favorable to the defendant's case. 139 According to the court in People
v. Richter, 140 evidence is favorable when it leads the finder of fact to
entertain reasonable doubt about the defendant's guilt. 14' Because
the presumption of legal intoxication generally arises with a breath
alcohol content reading of 0.10% ,142 a defendant would be asser-
ting a clearly dubious claim of favorableness when he had drunk
hard liquor for hours and registered 0.30 % on the breathalyzer. In
a close case, however, there may be reason to doubt the validity of
the breathalyzer test results. 143 Thus, a reasonable possibility of
favorableness often can be shown when the breathalyzer reading is
near 0.10 %.144
Along with favorableness, the Brady-Agurs test requires a
fourth element, materiality.145 The essence of favorableness is that
the pertinent evidence will cast doubt on the defendant's guilt.
146




137. See supra text accompanying notes 22-48.
138. Seesupra text accompanying notes 48-57.
139. See, e.g., Larson, 313 N.W.2d at 756 (defendant must produce "evidence which would
establish a reasonable probability that an analysis of the test ampoule would have provided material
evidence favorable to him").
140. People v. Richter, 102 Misc. 2d 285, 423 N.Y.S.2d 610 (Grim. Ct. 1979).
141. Id. at __, 423 N.Y.S.2d at 613.
142. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODe 5 39-20-07 (1980) (presumption of intoxication arises upon a
blood alcohol reading ofO.10o%) amended by S. 2373, 48th Leg., -. N.D. Sess. Laws -_ (a blood
alcohol reading of 0.10% is prima facie evidence of legal intoxication (effective.July 1, 1983)).
143. See, e.g., State v. Boehmer, 613 P.2d 916, 918-19 (Hawaii Ct. App. 1980) (reversed the
DWI convictions of two defendants who had test results of 0.10% and 0.11% because the
breathalyzer tests contained a stipulated error factor of0.0165%).
144. See id.
145. Agurs, 407 U.S. at 109-10; Brady, 373 U.S. at 87.
146. See, e.g., Richter, 102 Misc. 2d at-_, 423 N.Y.S.2d at 613 (favorable evidence leads ajury
to entertain a reasonable doubt about defendant's guilt).
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scientifically retested to produce reliable, useful results. 147 But if
retesting is a useless act, then the evidence obtained from the
retesting cannot cast doubt on the defendant's guilt. 148 With the
belief that ampoules cannot be retested to produce useful in-
formation, courts effectively preclude a defendant from establishing
materiality and favorableness. The requirements of favorableness
and materiality thus intertwine to defeat a defendant's right to
discovery. To prevail the defendant must focus his attention on
meeting the intertwined requirements of favorableness and
materiality. 14 9 A more detailed examination of materiality suggests
that the defendant assumes a difficult task in proving materiality.
III. MEETING THE REQUIREMENT OF MATERIALITY:
THE DEFENDANT'S DIFFICULT TASK
An elementary proposition in the proof of materiality is that a
defendant cannot hope for success in furthering a claim by bare
reliance on cases such as Hitch and Michener. 150 Rather, courts have
required that a defendant provide independent proof of
materiality. 151 This burden has most often been met by the use of
experts. 152 Once the defendant has located the necessary expert, his
next task is to determine what constitutes material evidence.
The materiality requirement of Brady-Agurs, as applied to the
discovery of ampoules, has been interpreted to require a defendant
to prove that the retesting of ampoules is not only scientifically
reliable, 153  but also that the retesting produces useful in-
formation. 154 Proof of both requirements can be established
through detailed test results and the testimony of an expert.155 The
results must be obtained through accepted scientific procedures. 156
147. See, e.g., Teare, 135 NJ. Super. at -, 342 A.2d at 558 (preservation of ampoule would
not give any scientifically reliable, material information).
148. Id.
149. See, e.g., Larson, 313 N.W.2d at 756. In Larson the North Dakota Supreme Court related
materiality to favorableness. Id. The court reasoned that material evidence is evidence favorable to a
defendant, negating his guilt. Id.
150. See, e.g., State v. Booth, 98 Wis. 2d 20, 28, 295 N.W.2d 194, 199 (Ct. App. 1980).
151. E.g., Booth, 98 Wis. 2d at 28, 295 N.W.2d at 199 (defendant offered substantial expert
testimony to demonstrate that a used test ampoule can either corroborate or refute the original test
results).
152. See, e.g., id.
153. See State v. Canaday, 90 Wash. 2d 808,_ , 585 P.2d 1185, 1188 (1978) (court adhered to
"the rule that reliability of scientific evidence must be shown as a prerequisite to its admission").
154. See State v. Irvin, 46 Or. App. 559, -, 612 P.2d 326, 327-28 (Ct. App. 1980) (retesting
of the used ampoule can produce meaningful evidence three and one-half months after
administration of the test).
155. See, e.g., People v. Richter, 102 Misc. 2d 285, -, 423 N.Y.S.2d 610, 613 (Crim. Ct.
1979) (expert testified that ampoules can be preserved).
156. See, e.g., State v. Canaday, 90 Wash. 2d 808, 585 P.2d 1185 (1978) (test results must be
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In establishing materiality the defendant may need to demon-
strate that ampoules can be retained and preserved without undue
procedures or expense. 15 7 In People v. Richter158 the defendant's ex-
pert testified that ampoules could be preserved.15 9 The trial court
concluded that an ampoule could be preserved in a number of
ways.160 For example, the test operator could preserve the ampoule
by placing it in a dark plastic container in which there is a vacuum
or by placing the ampoule under a blanket of nitrogen. 161
The packaging used to store the ampoule is also important.
For instance, in State v. Gibford 62 the Oregon Court of Appeals held
that an ampoule stored in tin foil could not produce, upon
retesting, material evidence. 163 The holding was based on test
results showing that the foil caused retest readings to be six times
higher than the original breathalyzer test results. 164 Therefore,
when establishing that the retesting of ampoules can produce
material evidence, the defendant should prove that the ampoule
was properly preserved after the original test was performed.
In addition to establishing the proper preservation of the am-
poule, the defendant will need to prove that retesting produces
scientifically reliable results. 165 In State v. Booth166 the Wisconsin
Court of Appeals held that, while the original breath test cannot be
recreated, reliable results can be obtained from retesting am-
poules.167 The holding was based on the trial court's findings that
properly preserved ampoules could be remeasured to determine
whether they contained the proper volume and concentration of
chemicals; that the volume of solution in the test ampoule is critical
to the accuracy of the breathalyzer; and that it always is possible to
determine whether the proper percentage of potassium dichromate
obtained by scientific means). Vapor phase chromatography and quantitative measurement of the
chemicals are common scientific procedures for the analysis of test results. Jones, How Breathing
Technique Can Influence the Results of Breath-AlcoholAnalysis, 22 MED. Sci. L. 275, 276 (1982).
157. See, e.g., People v. Richter, 102 Misc. 2d 285, -, 423 N.Y.S.2d 610, 613 (Grim. Ct.
1979).
158. 102 Misc. 2d 285, 423 N.Y.S.2d 610 (Grim. Ct. 1979).
159. Id. at -, 423 N.Y.S.2d at 613.
160. Id.
161. Id. See State v. Michener, 25 Or. App. 523, -, 550 P.2d 449, 452 (1976) ("The storage
of the ampoule is both economically and scientifically feasible and would not place a burden upon the
police agencies."); State v. Booth, 98 Wis. 2d 20, -, 295 N.W.2d 194, 196 (Ct. App. 1980)
("Capping a used ampoule is not technically difficult or costly.').
162. 40 Or. App. 77, 594 P.2d 858 (Ct. App. 1979).
163. State v. Gibford, 40 Or. App. 77, -, 594 P.2d 858, 859 (Ct. App. 1979).
164. Id.
165. See, e.g., State v. Canaday, 90 Wash. 2d 808, 585 P.2d 1185 (1978) (defendant failed to
demonstrate that retesting produces scientifically reliable results).
166. 98 Wis. 2d 20, 295 N.W.2d 194 (Ct. App. 1980).
167. State v. Booth, 98 Wis. 2d 20, 22, 295 N.W.2d 194, 196 (Ct. App. 1980).
19831 387
388 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 59:369
solution was present in the test ampoule. 1
68
The appellate court in Booth explained in general terms the
significance of the trial court's scientific findings. 169 The trial court
made four general chemical observations concerning ampoule
retesting. 170 First, if the solution in an ampoule is insufficient, the
test would produce an erroneously high result. 71 Second, if the
used ampoule lacked acetic acid, the ampoule would signify that the
suspect's breath sample did not contain ethyl alcohol. 172 Third, the
lack of chromium sulfate in the used ampoule would similarly
signify the absence of alcohol in the breath sample. 173 Finally,
retesting would also indicate whether the ampoule contained the
required 0.025% of potassium dichromate.174  In short, the
appellate court agreed with the experts at the suppression hearing
who stated that "the volume of the solution and the particular
concentration of chemicals in the ampoule are critical to the
accuracy of the breathalyzer test.' 175 The court added that the
expert testimony indicated that preserving an ampoule would not
be difficult; an ampoule could be easily stored by capping it. 1
76
Courts have also discussed the effect of dirty, distorted, or
fogged glass on ampoules. In Lauderdale v. State177 the Alaska
Supreme Court recognized that the character of the glass of the
ampoule bears directly on the accuracy of the breathalyzer test. 178
The court stated that either incorrect thickness or imperfections in
the glass would tend to distort the test results. 179 This distortion
would result in less light passing through the ampoule and cause a
168. Id. Commenting on the significance of sulfuric acid and potassium dichromate in the
ampoule, the Booth court stated:
When the sulfuric acid in the ampoule solution interacts with the alcohol in the
suspect's breath, the reagent divides into acids and sulfate. Although other organic
materials may produce a breathalyzer reading, the absence of acetic acid would mean
an absence ofalcohol in the suspect's breath.
The interaction of alcohol with the potassium dichromate in the ampoule
produces chromium sulfate. Its absence, therefore, indicates an absence of alcohol in
the test.
Id. at 23 nn.3-4, 295 N.W.2d at 196 nn.3-4. For a technical discussion of ampoule retesting, see
Wilkinson, Sockrider, Bartsch, Kataoka & Zettle, The Trapping, Storing, and Subsequent Analysis of
Ethanol in In-Vitro Samples Previously Analyzed by a Nondestructive Technique, 26 J. FORENSIC Sci. 671
(1981).








177. 548 P.2d 376 (Alaska 1976).
178. Lauderdale v. State, 548 P.2d 376, 379 (Alaska 1976). For a review of the operation of the
breathalyzer, see supra note 6.
179. 548 P.2d at 379.
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higher reading on the breathalyzer machine. 180
Finally, courts have recognized that foreign material in the
defendant's mouth or in the test ampoule would distort the
breathalyzer reading.181 In Scales v. City Court 82 the Arizona
Supreme Court stated that foreign particles composed of
hydrocarbons found inside the test ampoule would produce results
resembling the reaction between the ampoule chemicals and
alcohol. 183 The presence of these foreign particles would cause the
test results to be incorrect. 
184
In summary, to establish materiality in an attempt to discover
ampoules the moving party must show that the ampoules can be
preserved. Moreover, the moving party must also show that
examination and testing will reveal the contents of the ampoule, the
thickness and clarity of the glass walls, and the presence or absence
of foreign particles in the ampoule. With these elements of proof
established the ampoule should be discoverable. When a court
permits discovery, it will then be protecting the DWI defendant's
right to due process.
IV. CONCLUSION
The intensified creation and enforcement of DWI laws require
that attention be paid to the defendant's due process rights. Part of
that attention must go to ensuring that breath testing machines
used in DWI prosecutions are accurate. In this light, criminal
discovery procedures have been applied to breathalyzer test and
reference ampoules. To compel discovery the defendant must
make a request for the ampoule, demonstrate that the ampoule is in
the prosecutor's possession or control, show that discovery of the
ampoule is favorable to him, and indicate that the discovery is
material to his guilt or punishment.
While few courts have found ampoules to be discoverable, it is
hoped that with study and application of the judicial decisions
highlighted throughout this Article, more defendants will be
entitled to discovery - to the protection of their constitutional right
to due process.
180. Scales v. City Court. 122 Ariz. 231. -. 594 P.2d 97. 100 (1979).
181. Id.
182. 122 Ariz. 231. 594 P.2d 97 (1979).
183. Id. at . 594 P.2d at 100.
184. Id.
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